The World Bank documents an inverse relationship between per-capita incomes and child labor participation rates. We construct a life-cycle model with human and physical capital in which parents make a time allocation choice for their child. The model considers two features that have shown potential in explaining differences in states of development across nations. These are i) a minimum consumption requirement and ii) barriers to physical capital accumulation. We find the introduction of capital barriers alone is not enough to replicate the aformentioned observation by the World Bank. However, we find the interplay of a minimum consumption requirement and barriers to capital may enhance our understanding of child labor and the poverty of nations. Additionally, we find support for policies aimed at reducing capital barriers as a means to reduce child labor participation rates, as opposed to an out and out ban on child labor.
Introduction
The International Labor Office estimates there are some 250 million children between the ages 5 and 14 working in developing countries; approximately half do so on a fulltime basis (Ashagrie (1998) ). Worldwide, child labor participation rates are at a little over 10%, with estimated rates more than twice that for most of Africa and as high as 42% for Ethiopia. Setting aside the emotional issues associated with this subject, Figure 1 .1: Child Labor and Output the sheer number of children and hours worked suggest tremendous potential losses of human capital and output for these economies. Figure 1 .1 summarizes some evidence from World Bank studies regarding child labor and world income inequality. 1 This paper addresses the issue of child labor and its connection to the poverty of nations by introducing child labor and schooling into an otherwise conventional overlapping generations growth model à la Diamond (1966) . Two key ingredients of the model are a minimum consumption requirement and the presence of a barrier to capital accumulation. Both have been featured prominently in recent studies of economic development, but not, to the best of our knowledge, together in a neoclassical growth model. 2 The two seem natural starting points for a study of such significance to development economics such as child labor. Our model suggests that low per-capita income, child labor, and barriers to capital accumulation are ineluctably linked due to the presence of the minimum consumption requirement. Within this environment, the elimination of these barriers should be a top priority: not only will it lead to greater physical capital accumulation and an increase in output, it will also reduce the incidence of child labor and increase human capital accumulation. Absent the elimination of such barriers, efforts to ban or restrict child labor may impoverish these nations even further.
How do these pieces fit together? With a minimum consumption requirement, the elasticity of intertemporal substitution is an increasing function of agents' wealth -all else the same, agents invest proportionally more of their wealth as their wealth increases. Higher capital barriers, on the other hand, lead to lower capital accumulation and lower wealth. Together, the two imply that agents will allocate proportionally more resources to current consumption (invest less) when confronted with a higher capital barrier. This in turn raises the equilibrium effective rate of return on capital and reduces the present value of the child's future earnings, motivating parents to allocate less of their child's time to school and more to work.
Less prominent -but still critical to our formulation -are the presence of credit market imperfections and the absence of two-sided altruism between parent and child. Both play important roles in the child labor and human capital literature (Baland and (2003)). 3 In this paper, these assumptions preserve the lifecycle properties of the underlying overlapping generations model; without them, the model resembles an infinite-lived representative agent model -the steady state effective return to capital is pinned down by the time preference parameter and capital barriers have no impact on the allocation of the child's time. When intertemporal, intra-family member trades are not permitted, the inefficiencies of child labor discussed elsewhere in the literature are naturally present in our model as well. However, trade restrictions of these sorts in and of themselves seem unlikely candidates for explaining the differences in output and child labor participation rates across developing countries, as shown in Figure 1 .1. They are present, for example, in one version of our model, one that cannot replicate the stylized relationship represented in Figure 1 .1. 4 3 Basu (1999) contains a excellent summary of the literature prior to 2000. Our treatment of child labor most closely resembles Das and Deb (2003) . Both studies use an overlapping generations model and both assume preferences in which the agent's elastisity of intertemporal subsitution depends on wealth. However, there is no physical capital in their model, nor do they study barriers. 4 One difference between observations in Figure 1 .1 and those originating from the model stems from the way aggregate data on child labor are collected in most countries. Differences in child labor participation in Figure 1 .1 reflect differences along an extensive margin. Here, as in most theoretical studies on child labor, participation is measured along an intensive margin. Arguably, what matters -in terms of human capital accummulation and development -is the extent of participation along an intensive margin.
A formal description of the model is provided in Section 2. Here we derive the agents' optimal decision rules for consumption and capital investment, as well as characterize the optimal decision rule for the allocation of a child's time. The section also contains a description of the model's market-clearing conditions and a definition of a competitive equilibrium. The main results of the paper are contained in Section 3. We discuss the steady state properties of the model when there is no minimum consumption requirement, establishing, in Proposition 3, that changes in barriers to capital have no effect on child labor allocations in this setting. We then reinstate the minimum requirement, and show, under some mild assumptions on the steady-state returns, that an increase in the capital barrier reduces the time allocated for schooling (increases the amount of time the child works). These are accompanied by a decrease in the steady-state capital stock and a decrease in output. Section 4 contains a few illustrative examples; some concluding remarks are provided in Section 5.
The Model

Framework
Assume an overlapping generations model with agents that live three periods. Members of each generation are identical, the size of each generation is normalized to one. A final good is produced each date using inputs of labor and capital. As in Ngai (2003) , we follow Parente et al (2000) and assume there is a barrier to capital formation, represented by the parameter π > 1. The barrier -which drives a wedge between the return to investment and the marginal product of physical capital -is meant to reflect bribes, bureaucratic red tape, or other capital market distortions common to many developing economies. Each unit of the good invested at date t returns r t /π at t + 1, where r t is the marginal product of capital. The per-unit difference, r t (1 − 1/π), is assumed to disappear entirely from the economy. Agents in our model are endowed with a unit of time in each period of life. At each date, middle-age agents assume roles as heads of households, making contemporaneous consumption and time allocations for a family unit which includes themselves and their young offspring. 5 At this time, they also makes a capital investment decision, x t . The family unit is dissolved before the start of date t + 1, when members of generation t become heads of households of their own. Financial transfers ('bequests') across generations are permitted in one version of the model. In this version, the model resembles one of a single, infinite lived decisionmaker and does not shed much light on the issue of capital barriers and child labor. The lifecyle properties of the underlying overlapping generations model are restored when intra-family capital transfers are subject to a 5 For simplicity, we assume agents do not consume when young.
binding non-negativity constraint, as in the showcase version of the model. In this case, barriers can have an impact on the allocation of a child's time.
Agents do not value leisure, and allocations of work-time, when middle-age and old, equal the agent's time endowment of 1. A child's time, however, may be allocated to work, l t , or to the accumulation of human capital (schooling). Both are decided by the parent, who, when making the decisions, weighs the future returns to the child's human capital and marginal gain in the child's future, discounted utility, against the marginal loss in current utility due to the lower child earnings.
All consumption allocations must satisfy a minimum consumption requirement γ. It turns out that with a minimum requirement, the elasticity of intertemporal substitution depends positively on the agent's wealth. This is an essential feature of the model, as we demonstrate in our discussions below.
Technologies
The final good at each date is produced according to a conventional Cobb-Douglas production function, using inputs of labor and capital. We assume
where Y t denotes output and K t the input of physical capital at date t. The aggregate effective labor input, L t , is comprised of the effective labor input of children and their parents, L 1t = l t + h(1−l t−1 ), and labor of the current old, L 2t = h(1 −l t−2 ). Capital is assumed to depreciate fully in the production process. Additional assumptions on the production function for human capital, h(·), are provided in Assumption 2 of Section 3.
The presence of a barrier to capital implies
Factor payments in this economy are given by
and
Preferences and the Agent's Problem
The head of a household at date t chooses current consumption for herself, c 1t , as well as investments in physical capital x t and human capital for her child, h(1 − l t ). Transfers (bequests) b t between parent and child are made when the parent is middle-aged and command the same effective return as capital. 6 When old, the head of the household consumes c 2t+1 .
The utility U t of a middle-age decisionmaker at date t is given by
where γ > 0 is a minimum consumption requirement. The parameter, λ, 0 < λ < 1, measures how the parent feels toward her offspring as an adult. 7 The choices for c 1t , x t , c 2t+1 , l t , and b t conform to the constraints
where w t is the marginal product of a unit of unschooled labor at date t and r t is the rental price of capital.
Let θ t ≡ (l t−1; b t−1 ) and Ω t denote the set of state variables at date t beyond the control of the agent. The agent chooses consumption, capital, transfers, and time allocations for the child to solve
Assuming x t > 0 for all t, the household's optimal consumption allocations satisfy
The decisions for bequests and child labor time allocations, respectively, satisfy:
When b t > 0 and 0 < l t < 1, (F-3) becomes (using (F-2) and (F-3) with equality):
Alternatively, when the non-negativity constraint on bequests binds and 0 < l t < 1, we have
The intuition behind (5) and (6) is straightforward. When allocating the child's time, the middle-age decisionmaker equates the marginal utility lost to the household from sending the child to school in the current period, w t u 0 (c 1t ), to the marginal utility gained from the increment in the child's lifetime income of an additional unit of schooling, βλ(
, with equality, links the marginal rate of substitution between periods for any decisionmaker, u 0 (c 1t ) /βu 0 (c 2t+1 ), and the marginal rate of substitution across consumption of middleage decisionmakers, u 0 (c 1t ) /βλu 0 (c 1t+1 ) -both equal the effective return on capital, r t /π. Eq. (5) incorporates this link. When the non-negativity constraint on bequests binds (or equivalently, two-sided altruism is impossible), the link is severed, as in (6) . Without this link, the fact the parent makes the choice of human capital for the child very much matters. 8 Assumption 1 ensures the non-negativity constraint binds in the steady-state.
Using (F-1) , we obtain the elasticity of intertemporal substitution,
This elasticity is increasing in consumption and lies in the interval (0, 1/σ). Note, of course, that when the minimum consumption requirement γ = 0, is constant and equal to 1/σ.
The proposition below provides the optimal consumption, investment, and bequest decision rules. Note that if b t > 0, the investment and bequest decisions (though not their sum) are indeterminant.
Proposition 1 Given b t−1 and h (1 − l t−1 ) the agent's consumption and investment are
For much of Section 3 and the remainder of the paper thereafter, we assume the non-negativity constraint on bequest binds (i.e., b t = 0 for all t). We refer to the steady-state counterpart to (9) as the function x(r/π, w, l), where
We will also find it convenient to refer to x in two parts, with x = γx a + x b , where x a and x b are appropriately defined from x(r/π, w, l). Equation (6) summarizes the child labor decision. Solving for the marginal product of schooling,
In the steady-state, we have:
Equation (10) can be compared with the marginal condition for child schooling in Baland and Robinson (2000) . In their two-period model, there is no time discounting, no barriers to capital, and the return to capital equals one, so an interior solution for l in their model requires h 0 (1 − l) = 1.
In our model, the size of the barrier to capital π may possibly of affect the allocation of child labor, as evident from (10). This result stems from the fact that different values of the barrier may alter the present value of the child's future returns to schooling, through changes in the equilibrium effective return r/π. Unlike models of capital barriers with infinitely-lived agents, such as Parente et. al. (2000) , the steady-state effective return in a life-cycle model such as this one need not be pinned down by the preference parameter 1/β. It remains to show, then, under what conditions changes in the barrier will affect the return r/π, and how the child labor decision changes; both are addressed in Section 3.
Competitive Equilibrium
Given the initial stock of physical capital, K 1 , and human capital h(1−l s ), for s = 0, −1, an equilibrium for this economy consists of sequences for factor payments {w t , r t } ∞ t=1 , consumptions {c 1t , c 2t } ∞ t=1 , and investment, capital, and labor, {x t , K t+1 , L t , l t } ∞ t=1 such that 1. Given the factor payments, the allocations for consumption, investment, and child labor solve the agent's optimization problem.
2. Factor payments at each date are given by (3) and (4).
All markets clear:
Labor:
Goods:
Properties of the Steady-State
Our primary focus is on the comparative statics properties of the model's steady state, assuming the child's time allocation is interior. 9 The model's steady-state can be summarized by four equations: the factor payments
the marginal condition for the child's schooling,
and the steady-state clearing condition for the capital market,
For most of this section, we assume the nonnegatively constraint on bequests binds. Our strategy is to show that the model with barriers to capital alone cannot replicate the stylized observations of Figure 1. 1. We then demonstrate that by adding a minimum consumption requirement into the mix, barriers to capital can yield a negative relationship between output and child labor, similar in spirit to the World Bank observations. In making our central argument, we rely on a few ancillary steps. These are used to show how the inputs K and L respond to changes in the barrier π. From there we can infer how output changes with π, since any change in output can be decomposed into changes in the two inputs, dY/Y = α dK/K + (1 − α) dL/L. First, however, we state formally a proposition regarding the model's steady-state when the nonnegatively constaint on bequests does not bind.
Proposition 2. Assume steady-state bequests b > 0. Then r/π = 1/βλ and barriers to capital accumulation have no effect on child labor in the steady-state.
The first part of the proposition follows from (F-2) with equality, as noted in the previous section. The second part is implied by the marginal condition (10) . ¥
We next address the magnitude of the steady-state effective return r/π in our showcase model with no bequests, as well as the properties of the human capital production function h (·). The lower and upper bounds for r/π in Assumption 1 do two things. First, the lower bound, along with Assumption 2, ensures that the effective aggregate supply of labor is decreasing in child labor in the steady state (see Result 1 below). It can be shown that 1/β < r/π must hold in any steady-state with a positive capital stock, provided that γ is small enough. Second, as we have indicated, the upper bound ensures the non-negativity constraint for bequests is binding in the steady state. Establishing conditions which ensure the upper bound holds is a little more problematic. Our approach is similar to Ranganzas (2000); we assume the steady state return satisfies Assumption 1, and show in fact it obtains for appropriate values of the primitives.
The assumption h(0) = 1 means an adult worker with no human capital provides the same quality labor input as a child. The assumptions regarding the marginal conditions of h at the corners, along with the concavity of h and the continuity of its first derivative ensure an interior solution to (10) exists whenever Assumption 1 prevails.
For the remainder of the paper, we assume Assumption 1 holds, so b = 0.
We address next the issue of how each of the factors change with a change in the effective return. The first two results address how the effective aggregate labor supply changes, first in response to a given change in child labor, and second, how child labor changes in response to a change in r/π. The third result addresses how r/π affects capital. This result follows from the fact that
using (10) and Assumptions 1 and 2. ¥
The steady state labor supply of the family, L 1 = l + h (1 − l), on the other hand, may be increasing or decreasing in child work. The latter occurs whenever 1 < h 0 (1−l), and in spite of the negative impact on L 1 , a household head may still choose an interior solution for l, since she takes her own human capital h (1 − l) as given and hence is outside her control when the allocation choice for her child's time is made.
How does the child labor allocation change with a change in effective return r/π? We have:
Result 2. (Policy-induced changes in child labor). dl R 0 whenever dr/π R 0.
Differentiate (10) totally with respect to r, π,and l and solving for dl :
Since h(·) is strictly concave, h 00 (1 − l) < 0. Result 2 then follows. ¥ Taken together, the two results establish that an increase in the effective return reduces the effective supply of labor L at each date. Result 3 addresses how r/π impacts on capital. From (4), we have 
by the market-clearing condition (11) . The left-hand side of this expression is homogenous of degree 0 with respect to an equiproportional change in r and π, using Results 1 and 2. ¥ How then does an increase in the capital barrier impact on the economy in this instance? Its impact on output is felt solely through the impact on the steady state capital stock. Since
Note that this is the same outcome, if say, the non-negativity constraint on bequests did not bind (for in this case, the steady state return satisfies r/π = 1/βλ, by constraint (F-3)).
Our main result follows. Proof: See the Appendix.
The difference between Propositions 3 and 4 is largely due to the change in wages and its impact on investment. In our baseline case, with γ = 0, investment x falls by the same proportion as wages, when π rises. From (3), dw w = α dK K in the baseline case,
By contrast, when γ > 0, investment falls proportionally more than wages. For the ease of discussion, suppose the labor supply is constant. Then, as steady state wages (wealth) fall, the elasticity of intertemporal substitution falls -the relative consumption allocation of agents shifts in favor of consuming when young -so investment falls proportionally more than baseline. Since
Changes in the labor supply and in the effective return r/π mitigate some of the impact of the fall in wealth on investment. The overall impact of a change in π on K, when l is allowed to adjust, lies between the two polar cases with fixed labor inputs, with l = 0 and l = 1.
Note that the conditioning if in Proposition 4 does not appear too restrictive -by
For the capital return to fall, in this instance, the increase in the capital barrier would need to have a proportionally larger impact on the labor supply than on the capital stock. This does not appear likely, though it cannot be ruled out based solely on our comparative statics.
Discussion
Our results suggests that child labor participation rates and capital barriers should be positively related. The figure below uses observations on child labor participation rates from World Development Indicators 2000 and from the relative price of capital from Chad Jones' Website. It depicts a positive relationship between the two variables, consistent with the model's prediction. 
Some Illustrative Examples
Barriers, child labor, and output.
We illustrate some of the qualitative properties of our featured model using a simple numerical example. Set β = .8, σ = .40, α = .30, A = 3.0, λ = .45 and the minimum consumption requirement, γ = .15. We assume h(x) = (1 + v Log(1 + x)). Note that h(0) = 1 and h 0 (0) = v and h 0 (1) = v/2. Setting v = 2.5, Assumptions 1 and 2, and Result 2 are satisfied for 1 ≤ π ≤ 25. Figure 4 .1 below provides a hypothetical crosssectional plot of child labor and output for economies with the same primitives, varying the capital barrier π from 1 to 25. All observations in 4.1 are relative to the no-barrier (π = 1) economy.
Banning child labor.
Next, we provide an example that illustrates our assertion that a ban on child labor may further impoverish an nation, unless capital barriers are removed. We assume the same parameter values listed above, with the exception v = 1.3.
Set π = 1. In this instance, the time allocation is a corner, l = 1, since the returns to human capital are so low. Without a ban on child labor, output is 9.431 and steadystate utility is -115.357; with the ban, output increases to 9.883 and utility rises to -115.344. Why doesn't a ban on child labor increase steady-state output unless accompanied by a reduction in the capital barrier? In this case, the low productivity of schooling ν means the ban will have a small impact on the overall effective labor supply. The ban also reduces the relative labor supply ratio L 1 /L 2 (from 2 to 1 in this case). This shift in the ratio reduces capital investment, and, since the marginal product of capital is fairly high (due to the high barrier and its effect on K) , there can be a drop in output, as illustrated in this example. On the other hand, for lower barriers, the marginal product of capital will be lower, and the increase in the effective labor supply L that accompanies the ban on child labor more than offsets the impact of a lower capital stock on output, and output rises. 10 
Conclusions
This paper provides a general equilibrium model of child labor and physical and human capital. We imbed child labor into a standard neoclassical growth model using the assumption the parent makes the schooling/labor decision of the child. The paper focuses on the critical role a minimum consumption requirement may play in explaining observed child labor differences across developing economies. We make the argument that under certain conditions, higher capital barriers can 'deepen' child labor participation along an intensive margin. The model also suggests that by reducing capital barriers, developing countries can reduce child labor. Without a reduction in capital barriers, it is not evident that imposing stricter barriers to child labor participation will improve the lot of a country.
Additionally, from factor payments, we know wages can be written w = (1 − α) ¡ r α ¢ α α−1 , so dw w = αθ 1 dr r (A-4)
From the market clearing condition x = πK; we have
Solving for dr/r, using (A-1) -(A-5), we have
We need to show the term in brackets in (A-6) is greater than 1 when γ > 0 and dr/r > 0.
If dr/r > 0,the numerator and denominator of (A-6) must be of the same sign. Since 1 > −θ 1 (1 − αη 3 ) =
(1−αη 3 ) 1−α , by the fact that 0 < η 3 < 1 when γ > 0, the numerator of (A-6) is greater in absolute value then its denominator. Hence Note that the proof of Proposition 3 is also evident, from (A-6). When γ = 0, the term in brackets in (A-6) is 1, since η 3 = 1 if γ = 0, as noted above.
